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Studies by thousands of scientists have established that 
human activities are changing the Earth’s climate, princi-
pally through raising the concentration of radiatively active 
(greenhouse) gases in the atmosphere. Reports from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; 2013) 
bring much of this evidence together. National science acad-
emies, and organizations representing hundreds of thousands 
of scientists, have issued their own statements or reports on 
the risks of anthropogenic climate change (ACC; National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], 2016). 
Direct surveys of scientists find levels of agreement on the 
reality of ACC ranging from 87% among American 
Association for the Advancement of Science members gen-
erally, to 93% among working PhD Earth scientists (Pew 
Research Center, 2015) or 97% among active climate 
research scientists (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 
2010; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009). Two analyses of pub-
lished research similarly report high-90s agreement on the 
reality of ACC (Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes, 2004). 
Synthesizing recent studies, Cook et al. (2016) observe that 
the level of consensus rises with expertise of the scientists 
considered: Agreement is strongest among the most active 
researchers.
In contrast to the overwhelming consensus among scien-
tists, acceptance of ACC remains stubbornly lower among 
the U.S. public—until recently, polling mostly in the mid-
50s on surveys (e.g., Hamilton, Hartter, Lemcke-Stampone, 
Moore, & Safford, 2015; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-
Renouf, Feinberg, & Rosenthal, 2015). Similar fractions of 
the public concede a scientific consensus on the reality of 
ACC. Individual perceptions that ACC is real, and that most 
scientists agree on this point, correlate with each other and 
have similar background predictors (e.g., Hamilton & Saito, 
2015), to such an extent they could be two indicators for one 
underlying dimension (Kahan, 2015a; Kahan, Jenkins-
Smith, & Braman, 2011). Other researchers have argued that 
their correlation reflects causality. According to this view, 
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Questions about climate change elicit some of the widest political divisions of any items on recent U.S. surveys. Severe 
polarization affects even basic questions about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC), or whether most scientists 
agree that humans are changing the Earth’s climate. Statements about scientific consensus have been contentious among 
social scientists, with some arguing for consensus awareness as a “gateway cognition” that leads to greater public acceptance 
of ACC, but others characterizing consensus messaging (deliberate communication about the level of scientific agreement) 
as a counterproductive tactic that exacerbates polarization. A series of statewide surveys, with nationwide benchmarks, 
repeated questions about the reality of ACC and scientific consensus many times over 2010 to 2016. These data permit tests 
for change in beliefs and polarization. ACC and consensus beliefs have similar trends and individual background predictors. 
Both rose gradually by about 10 points over 2010 to 2016, showing no abrupt shifts that might correspond to events such as 
scientific reports, leadership statements, or weather. Growing awareness of the scientific consensus, whether from deliberate 
messaging or the cumulative impact of many studies and publicly engaged scientists, provides the most plausible explanation 
for this rise in both series. In state-level data, the gap between liberal and conservative views on the reality of ACC did not 
widen over this period, whereas the liberal–conservative gap regarding existence of a scientific consensus narrowed.
Keywords
sociology, social sciences, environment and technology, social change and modernization, science communication, human 
communication, communication studies, communication, environmental psychology, applied psychology, psychology, science, 
knowledge, technology
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Table 1. Climate Change Questions, Respondent Characteristics, and Ideology.
Dependent variables
 Climate—Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate?
  Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (1; New Hampshire 63%, United States 63%).
  Climate change is happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces (0; New Hampshire 27%, United States 30%).
  Climate change is not happening now (0; New Hampshire 4%, United States 3%).
  Don’t know/no answer (0; New Hampshire 6%, United States 4%).
 Consensus—Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate?
  Most scientists agree that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (1; New Hampshire 64%, United 
States 66%).
  There is little agreement among scientists whether climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (0; New 
Hampshire 27%, United States 26%).
  Don’t know/no answer (0; New Hampshire 8%, United States 7%).
Independent variables
 Age—Respondent age in years (range = 18-96 years; New Hampshire M = 48, United States M = 46).
 Female—Respondent gender, female (1; New Hampshire = 51%, United States 51%) or male (0; New Hampshire 49%, United States 
49%)
 Education—Postgraduate (2; New Hampshire 24%, United States 21%), college graduate (1; New Hampshire 33%, United States 30%), 
some college or technical school (0; New Hampshire 24%, United States 31%), high school or less (−1; New Hampshire 20%, United 
States 18%).
 Ideology—Conservative (2; New Hampshire 20%, United States 24%), moderately conservative (1; New Hampshire 23%, United States 
20%), moderate (0; New Hampshire 15%, United States 16%), moderately liberal (−1; New Hampshire 21%, United States 21%), 
liberal (−2; New Hampshire 22%, United States 20%).
Note. Shown with codes used for regressions in Table 2, and weighted response summaries from the 2016 New Hampshire and U.S. (POLES) surveys. 
POLES = Polar, Environment, and Science.
awareness of the scientific consensus comprises a gateway 
cognition: a key belief or understanding which, if accepted, 
makes people more likely also to accept that ACC is real, or 
that action is needed to slow it (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, 
Feinberg, & Maibach, 2014). Experimentally, consensus 
messaging or providing information about the extent of sci-
entific agreement can increase subsequently expressed 
acceptance of ACC (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 
2013; Maibach, Myers, & Leiserowitz, 2014; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2016). Some analyses of survey 
questions about consensus and climate report findings con-
sistent with this gateway role (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-
Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 
2013; also see Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014).
Experimental and survey approaches have complementary 
strengths and limitations. Experiments can show that certain 
responses change after exposure to information, which pro-
vides good evidence for causality in that context, but does not 
answer how effects scale up over longer periods in uncontrolled 
social environments where contrary information is abundant. 
Non-experimental surveys sample views from such uncon-
trolled environments, but provide mainly indirect evidence 
about causality. The gateway and same-dimension hypotheses 
need not be mutually exclusive, however. That belief in agree-
ment among scientists might in some instances or for some 
people influence beliefs about ACC, whereas in other cases 
they measure essentially the same thing, is quite plausible 
although analytically intractable.
Kahan (2016) takes a position against consensus messaging: 
“All the ‘social marketing’ of ‘scientific consensus’ does is aug-
ment the toxic idioms of contempt that are poisoning our sci-
ence communication environment.” In part, his view is based on 
data in which public perceptions about the scientific consensus 
show less polarization than perceptions about ACC itself. Also, 
the degree of polarization (the gap between people with oppo-
site ideologies or worldviews) tends to be widest among those 
with higher education or information by several measures. More 
basically, he argues that there has been little movement in con-
sensus or ACC perceptions despite “a decades-long social mar-
keting campaign” to inform people (Kahan, 2015b).
But has there been recent movement on either question? 
Is polarization consistently rising? These questions are test-
able with data from a lengthening time series of random-
sample surveys covering one northeastern U.S. state since 
2010. The surveys carried two basic questions assessing pub-
lic thoughts on the reality of ACC and agreement among sci-
entists. Benchmarked by nationwide surveys that asked the 
same questions, the statewide data provide unique temporal 
resolution for tracking change.
Survey Data
Since spring of 2010, the Granite State Poll (GSP), run by the 
Survey Center at the University of New Hampshire, has car-
ried the same basic climate-change question alongside its 
usual mix of political and other topics including science and 
environment.1 Table 1 gives the wording of the climate-change 
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question (climate); the order of response choices is rotated by 
telephone interviewers to avoid possible bias. One of these 
choices—climate change is happening now, caused mainly by 
human activities—corresponds to the central point of many 
statements by scientific organizations (e.g., the first sentence 
in American Geophysical Union [AGU], 2013). As of summer 
2016, this question had been asked in more than 15,000 inter-
views in 26 New Hampshire surveys, plus a similar number of 
interviews in other regional or national surveys (Hamilton 
et al., 2015; Hamilton, 2016).
A second question with parallel wording (consensus) asks 
whether respondents think most scientists agree that climate 
change is happening now, caused mainly by human activi-
ties. This question appeared on 11 of the New Hampshire 
surveys. Table 1 gives probability-weighted response per-
centages for climate and consensus from the most recent year 
of New Hampshire surveys (2016), and for comparison also 
the same questions on the U.S. nationwide Polar, 
Environment, and Science (POLES) survey conducted in 
August 2016 (Hamilton, 2016). Background characteristics 
age, gender, education, and ideology are summarized for 
both surveys as well.
Figure 1 graphically compares the climate and consensus 
responses. Sixty-three percent of both New Hampshire and 
U.S. respondents think that climate change is happening 
now, caused mainly by human activities; and 64% or 66% 
think that most scientists agree on this point. The visual simi-
larity between climate and consensus beliefs is striking, and 
its implication of substantial overlap is true. Of those who 
think that climate change is happening now, caused mainly 
by human activities, 85% (New Hampshire) or 86% (United 
States) also think that most scientists agree on this point.
How representative are the New Hampshire data? In 
terms of the overall percentages, Figure 1 suggests they are 
close. Hamilton et al. (2015) show overlapping confidence 
intervals across a larger set of New Hampshire and national 
surveys that asked the same climate question. A Gallup sur-
vey in March 2016, with differently worded questions, pro-
vides another national benchmark: 59% ± 4% believe the 
effects of global warming have already begun and 65% ± 4% 
believe that increases in global temperatures over the past 
century are due more to human activities than to nature (Saad 
& Jones, 2016). Although mildly inconsistent with each 
other, either Gallup result roughly agrees with the 63% ± 2% 
of New Hampshire respondents choosing now/human. Both 
Gallup percentages in 2016 were the highest for at least 8 
years. The 63% now/human responses to climate on the 2016 
POLES survey likewise is notably higher than on national 
surveys that had asked this question in 2011, 2012, or 2014. 
New Hampshire results conform to a similar pattern, with 
2016 percentages that are highest in the 7-year history of this 
question.
Figure 1. Response to climate-change and scientific-agreement questions on New Hampshire and U.S. nationwide surveys in 2016.
Note. DK/NA = Don’t know/no answer.
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From these comparisons and others, it appears that New 
Hampshire provides a usable proxy, giving similar-to-national 
overall percentages on climate issues although generally 
wider-than-national divisions by political party (Hamilton 
et al., 2015). The regional scope of the New Hampshire sur-
veys is a limitation, but they also have strengths: sharper 
(quarterly) temporal resolution than national counterparts, 
with consistent frames, wording, and methods under the same 
investigators throughout the whole series.
Changing Views on Climate and 
Consensus
Figure 2A graphs the percentage of now/human responses to cli-
mate on 26 New Hampshire surveys (n = 15,931) from April 
2010 to July 2016, along with four national surveys. A July 2016 
New Hampshire survey and the August 2016 U.S. POLES sur-
vey form the two rightmost data points in Figure 2A. This plot 
suggests an uneven upward trend in acceptance of ACC, amount-
ing to about 10 points over this period. New Hampshire’s confi-
dence intervals overlap with each of the four national surveys.
National Community and Environment in Rural America 
(NCERA) is a representative 50-state telephone survey orga-
nized by University of New Hampshire researchers in sum-
mer 2011 (n = 2,006).
General Social Survey (GSS) is a representative national 
survey based on face-to-face interviews, conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, in 
2012 (n = 1,295).
iMediaEthics Poll on Climate Change (IME) is a repre-
sentative national telephone survey conducted by Princeton 
Survey Research Associates International in July 2014 (n = 
1,002).
POLES is a representative national telephone survey 
organized by University of New Hampshire and Columbia 
University researchers in August 2016 (n = 704).
Hamilton et al. (2015) give references concerning the 
NCERA, GSS, and IME surveys. The supporting informa-
tion archived with that paper includes complete NCERA and 
IME data sets. The August 2016 POLES survey is described 
by Hamilton (2016).
Ideological or partisan divisions are a dominant feature of 
climate-change questions in surveys. For the New Hampshire 
time series, Figure 2B breaks down the percentage of now/
human responses to climate by ideology, on a 5-point scale 
from liberal to conservative.2 Percentages based on the 
smaller subsamples forming each ideological category exhibit 
more random variation, but show a persistently wide gap 
between conservatives and liberals. Figure 2B visualizes the 
strong polarization of climate-change responses in surveys. 
Figure 2. Percentage who think climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities.
Note. Plotted by median interview date on four U.S. and 26 New Hampshire surveys (A); and separated by ideology on the New Hampshire surveys (B). 
NCERA = National Community and Environment in Rural America; IME = iMediaEthics Poll on Climate Change; GSS = General Social Survey; POLES = 
Polar, Environment, and Science.
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The most conservative respondents are farthest from other 
groups; see Hamilton and Saito (2015) for other instances of 
that pattern.
Figure 3 employs a similar format to display results for the 
consensus question, tracking the percentage of respondents 
who think most scientists agree that human activities are chang-
ing the climate. It bears emphasizing that this consensus ques-
tion asks whether respondents think that most scientists agree 
about the existence of ACC, not about all of its details where 
scientific disagreements and new advances naturally occur.
Although based on fewer interviews (n = 5,872 from 11 sur-
veys for New Hampshire, along with the NCERA, IME, and 
POLES national surveys), the consensus results in Figure 3 
generally resemble those for climate in Figure 2. There is an 
uneven upward drift of roughly 10 points overall (Figure 3A). 
Again, the confidence intervals of New Hampshire results 
overlap with those of contemporary national surveys. The lib-
eral–conservative gap in Figure 3B is slightly narrower than 
that in Figure 2B: Beliefs about agreement among scientists are 
marginally less polarized than beliefs about ACC itself.
Individual Background and Ideology Effects
In Figures 2 and 3, climate and consensus beliefs exhibit 
similar patterns of slow upward drift. To test formally 
whether the percentage accepting ACC or recognizing agree-
ment among scientists has risen, we can include year in a 
standard regression framework that has been widely used to 
model individual-level predictors of climate beliefs.
Table 2 gives results from weighted logit regression of 
climate and consensus on respondent age, sex, education, 
and ideology (questions and coding defined in Table 1).3 
Models 1 and 2, based on New Hampshire data, also test for 
net effects from survey year (2010-2016). Model 1 does so 
using data from all 26 New Hampshire surveys that carried 
the climate question (estimation sample, n = 14,265), 
whereas Model 2 employs only the 11 surveys that asked the 
consensus question (estimation sample, n = 5,313). Models 3 
and 4 give results from the POLES survey for a national 
comparison (2016 only). The fit of each model is summa-
rized by probability-weighted versions of the count R2 and 
adjusted count R2 statistics described in Long and Freese 
(2014).
Interaction effects involving education and ideology have 
been detected in many survey and experimental data sets. 
Their common form is that ideological divisions regarding 
climate change widen with education, such that the best edu-
cated partisans stand the farthest apart. This occurs not only 
with education but also with other information indicators 
such as self-assessed understanding, or more objective tests 
Figure 3. Percentage who think most scientists agree that human activities are changing the climate.
Note. Plotted by median interview date on three U.S. and 11 New Hampshire surveys (A); and separated by ideology on the New Hampshire surveys 
(B). NCERA = National Community and Environment in Rural America; IME = iMediaEthics Poll on Climate Change; POLES = Polar, Environment, and 
Science.
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of science literacy, numeracy, cognitive reflection, or science 
intelligence. It occurs also whether ideology is indicated by 
respondent’s self-identification on a liberal to conservative 
scale, political party, religiosity, or more elaborate measures 
of worldview (e.g., Hamilton, 2008, 2011; Hamilton & 
Keim, 2009; Hamilton, Cutler, & Schaefer, 2012; Kahan, 
2015a; Kahan et al., 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Shao, 
Keim, Garland, & Hamilton, 2014). Finally, such interac-
tions affect some non-climate views too—for example, 
regarding evolution, vaccines, scientists, or environmental 
protection in general (e.g., Hamilton, Colocousis, & Duncan, 
2010; Hamilton, Hartter, & Saito, 2015; Hamilton & Safford, 
2015; Hamilton & Saito, 2015).
The models in Table 2 fit reasonably well (adjusted count 
R2 from 18%-34%) and confirm that climate-change and 
consensus beliefs have mostly the same individual-level pre-
dictors. Coefficients shown are odds ratios, or multiplicative 
effects on the odds of thinking that humans are changing the 
climate (climate = 1) or that most scientists agree (consensus 
= 1). The odds of thinking that humans are changing the cli-
mate, or that most scientists agree on this, decline with age. 
Women more often than men accept that humans are chang-
ing the climate, but gender makes little difference in percep-
tions of the scientific consensus. Odds ratios significantly 
above 1.0 for the main effect of education indicate that 
among moderate respondents (ideology = 0), the odds of 
accepting ACC, or that scientists agree, increase with higher 
education. Odds ratios below 1.0 for the main effect of ideol-
ogy indicate that among respondents with technical school or 
some college education (education = 0), the odds of accept-
ing ACC, or that scientists agree, decline as ideology 
becomes more conservative.
Figure 4 visualizes the New Hampshire education × ide-
ology interaction effects, which are significant and similar in 
the U.S. POLES data as well. These adjusted marginal plots 
(Mitchell, 2012) depict probabilities and 95% confidence 
intervals. Their right-opening megaphone shapes resemble 
those found in many studies cited above. Here, we see that 
among liberals and moderates, the probability of thinking 
that humans are changing the climate, or that most scientists 
agree on this point, rises with education. Among moderately 
conservative respondents, however, education has virtually 
no effect. Among the most conservative, belief that humans 
are changing the climate or that most scientists agree declines 
with higher education.
Viewing plots of this general type, some analysts have 
concluded that information itself causes polarization. Given 
the occurrence of similar patterns with diverse information 
or education indicators, however, it seems more plausibly 
attributed to general processes of biased assimilation 
(Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011), elite cues (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012; 
Darmofal, 2005), and related concepts (Campbell & Kay, 
2014; Kahan et al., 2011; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Wood & 
Vedlitz, 2007). Better educated or informed individuals more 
actively acquire information, which sometimes involves fil-
tering to support ideological beliefs. In reactions to experi-
mental scenarios, such processes might appear left/right 
symmetrical, with opposite bias affecting both ends of the 
spectrum. In practice, however, it is much easier to find top-
ics (such as climate or evolution) where liberal and moderate 
views align with a major scientific consensus, whereas con-
servatives oppose it, rather than the reverse. A corresponding 
asymmetry appears in survey findings that liberals and mod-
erates express greater trust than conservatives regarding sci-
ence in general (Gauchat, 2012; Nadelson et al., 2014), or as 
a source of information in specific domains including not 
only climate and evolution but also vaccines, nuclear power 
safety, and genetically modified organisms (Hamilton, 2015; 
Hamilton et al., 2015).
Table 2. Ideology, Background Characteristics, and Year of Survey as Predictors of Climate-Change and Scientific-Agreement 
Responses (Variables Defined in Table 1).
Model
Predictor 1. NH Climate 2. NH Consensus 3. U.S. Climate 4. U.S. Consensus
Age 0.988*** 0.993** 0.984** 0.985**
Female 1.315*** 1.029 1.463 0.938
Education 1.208*** 1.240*** 1.262* 1.303**
Ideology 0.528*** 0.543*** 0.542*** 0.562***
Education × Ideology 0.828*** 0.837*** 0.725*** 0.849*
Year 1.057*** 1.094*** — —
Estimation sample 14,266 5,313 601 601
F statistic 301.5*** 125.3*** 171.1*** 126.0***
Count R2 .72 .71 .75 .73
Adjusted count R2 .34 .33 .29 .18
Note. Odds ratios from weighted logistic regressions using NH or national POLES (U.S.) survey data. NH = New Hampshire; POLES = Polar, 
Environment, and Science.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Time plots in Figures 2A and 3A suggest that public 
acceptance of ACC and a scientific consensus have drifted 
upward over the past 7 years. Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 test 
this hypothesis by including survey year along with respon-
dent characteristics among the predictors. Both find signifi-
cant (p < .001) positive effects. The odds of thinking that 
human activities are changing the climate increased about 
6% (multiplied by 1.06) per year over this period, whereas 
the odds of thinking that most scientists agree increased 
somewhat faster, by about 9% per year. If awareness of the 
scientific consensus acts as a gateway cognition, then we 
might expect acceptance of ACC to change a bit more slowly 
as it seems to do here.
Trends in Polarization
The New Hampshire analysis agrees with national reports 
that public belief in the reality of ACC, and of a scientific 
consensus on this point, have recently risen (Saad & Jones, 
2016). There also is evidence that national polarization con-
currently increased (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016), but 
in New Hampshire, it appears to have decreased. Figure 5 
quantifies polarization as the distance between climate views 
of liberal and conservative respondents, or between those of 
moderately liberal and moderately conservative respondents. 
Graphed points correspond to distances from lowest to high-
est lines (or from second lowest to second highest) in Figure 
2B. Averaged by simple regression in the graph, the liberal/
conservative gap narrows slightly, and not significantly, from 
66 to 58 points. The moderately liberal/moderately conserva-
tive gap remains unchanged at about 36.
Figure 6 performs a similar analysis addressing the more 
contentious (among researchers) issue of polarization about 
the scientific consensus. In this case, both trend lines show 
mild but statistically significant narrowing, by about 10 
points, of the gap between liberals and conservatives. Thus, 
our New Hampshire time series indicate that contrary to 
national trends (Dunlap et al., 2016), polarization regarding 
ACC did not increase over this period, and regarding the sci-
entific consensus it clearly declined.
Although trends in ideological polarization are inconsis-
tent, national and state data agree that overall public accep-
tance of ACC and consensus has been rising through small 
gains across the ideological spectrum. Whether ideological 
divisions have decreased from high levels (as in New 
Hampshire), or increased from somewhat lower levels (as 
nationally), they remain presently quite wide. Ideological 
indicators dominate the variation in individual views, and 
ideology moderates effects from education, otherwise the 
second most important background predictor.
Figure 4. Interaction of education and ideology affecting respondents’ beliefs about the reality of ACC (A), and whether most scientists 
agree on this reality (B).
Note. Adjusted marginal plots based on Models 1 and 2 in Table 2. ACC = anthropogenic climate change; NH = New Hampshire.
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Discussion
The scientific case for ACC was well developed before these 
surveys began (Weart, 2008), with evidence from many disci-
plines that seemed persuasive to most scientists (Oreskes, 
2004). Incremental advances have continued over the past 7 
years, but from a public perspective, the contributions of indi-
vidual studies are hard to judge, and prominent new studies are 
quickly dismissed with scientific-sounding counterarguments 
from contrarians (Dunlap & McCright, 2015). Recognizing 
Figure 5. Liberal–conservative and moderately liberal–moderately conservative gap on acceptance of ACC, 26 New Hampshire surveys 
2010-2016 (with linear trends).
Note. ACC = anthropogenic climate change.
Figure 6. Liberal–conservative and moderately liberal–moderately conservative gaps on whether most scientists agree, 11 New 
Hampshire surveys 2010-2016 (with linear trends).
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that the general public has limited ability to evaluate research, 
or weigh contradictory but scientific-sounding claims, a grow-
ing number of science organizations and individual scientists 
engaging with the public have moved to emphasize the extent 
of scientific agreement (consensus messaging). This is meant 
as a useful heuristic to help non-scientists sort through com-
peting claims, without asserting that whatever scientists agree 
upon must be true—broad agreement on the reality of ACC 
reflects scientists’ own evaluations of the evidence, rather than 
being evidence for climate change in itself.
Some commentators have proposed that people acknowl-
edge a scientific consensus, while rejecting the reality of ACC, 
because they think most scientists are not credible—and that 
this group of doubters is growing. Accusations of hoax and con-
spiracy fuel such a narrative (Dunlap & McCright, 2015; 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013), although the parti-
san sources making those accusations tend also to deny the exis-
tence of a scientific consensus, painting climate research instead 
as the project of relatively few individuals and organizations.4
In terms of background characteristics, however, survey 
respondents who say they think that ACC is not happening, 
but also think most scientists agree that it is (i.e., respond 
climate = 0 but consensus = 1) resemble an unsure and pos-
sibly transitional group, rather than committed believers. In 
several data sets, those with mixed views tend to be some-
what younger, less educated, and more likely to identify as 
moderate or liberal, compared with more “consistent” 
respondents who reject both ACC and consensus (i.e., cli-
mate = 0 and consensus = 0).5
Conclusion
Tracked by a series of closely spaced statewide surveys (bench-
marked by nationwide surveys), public acceptance of the real-
ity of ACC and of scientific agreement rose gradually from the 
low fifties in 2010 to low sixties by 2016. The observation that 
acceptance of ACC and consensus both increased is compatible 
with the proposition that implicitly or explicitly communicat-
ing evidence of agreement among scientists encourages public 
acceptance of ACC itself. It appears incompatible with the 
reverse, that communicating evidence of scientific agreement 
could depress overall public acceptance of ACC.
At the individual level, perceptions regarding the reality 
of ACC and consensus have similar background predictors. 
Ideology is the strongest of these predictors. Moreover, ideo-
logical differences on ACC and consensus tend to be greatest 
among respondents with higher education. Over 2010 to 
2016, the gap between consensus perceptions of liberals and 
conservatives decreased in New Hampshire, although it 
increased nationwide, and in both cases remains large.
Has deliberate or incidental communication reinforcing 
public awareness of the scientific consensus helped to shift 
people’s views, or raised acceptance of ACC itself? Our survey 
results cannot establish causality. But given the lack of visible 
impacts from events, cumulative efficacy in communicating 
the scientific consensus appears a plausible explanation for 
gradually rising public acceptance of the reality of ACC.
Although public acceptance of ACC rose over the years 
studied, it remains well below the level of agreement among 
scientists. Public concern also has not translated into voting 
behavior because parties have become social identities in the 
United States. People’s social commitment to keeping the 
other party from power overcomes the mixture of views they 
might hold on particular issues (Dunlap et al., 2016; Mason, 
2015). Our findings give encouragement but no cause for 
complacency among scientists engaged with the public; if 
public engagement has had some success, it still has a long 
way to go. And public opinion, unlike melting ice sheets, can 
reverse course very quickly. Future surveys in this series will 
continue monitoring, for good or bad news.
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Notes
1. The Granite State Poll (GSP) employs trained and supervised 
interviewers, calling randomly selected landline and cell telephone 
numbers. Interviews last about 15 min and cover approximately 40 
questions, including without emphasis a few about climate. Response 
rates over this period ranged from 16% to 32% by the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research’s (AAPOR; 2006) defini-
tion 4. Probability weights are calculated to allow minor adjustments 
for design or sampling bias, and applied to all analyses in this article. 
The GSP faces reality testing with each election, and becomes nation-
ally prominent every 4 years in the context of New Hampshire’s 
presidential primary (Moore & Smith, 2015). It has proven to be a 
capable platform for basic research (e.g., Hamilton, 2012).
2. The GSP asks respondents to place themselves on a 9-point scale 
from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (9), with mod-
erate (leaning neither way) in the center (5). Detailed analysis finds 
that in practice, some of these are not very different. For example, 
the distinction between moderate, leaning a little more toward the 
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conservative side (6 on the scale where 5 is simply moderate) and 
somewhat conservative (7) does not seem to be sharp in many 
people’s minds, judging by the similar answers these two groups 
give to other questions. We obtain more consistently interpretable 
results using a simpler scheme with five categories: liberal (origi-
nally 9 or 8), moderately liberal (7 or 6), moderate (5), moderately 
conservative (4 or 3), or conservative (2 or 1). People who say they 
do not know or otherwise declined to answer the ideology question 
(about 7% of the total) do not appear to form a coherent group, so 
are set aside for analyses involving ideology.
3. Some studies employ much longer lists of predictors, but 
these often reduce precision (raise standard errors and reduce 
sample size) while showing inconsistent effects. In contrast, 
the compact set of predictors used here has proven replicable 
across dozens of independent data sets, often with agreement 
not only on statistical significance but effect magnitudes (e.g., 
odds ratios) as well. For example, Hamilton et al. (2015) apply 
this general regression framework to the climate question 
asked in 35 separate surveys.
4. Michael Mann (2013) characterizes the politically focused 
attacks on individual scientists (rather than large organiza-
tions or disciplines that hold similar views) as a “Serengeti 
strategy,” referencing the way African predators separate indi-
vidual prey animals from the herd.
5. Similar observations apply to the mirror-image group (about 
the same size) who accept anthropogenic climate change 
(ACC) but do not think most scientists agree (climate = 1 and 
consensus = 0). They likewise tend to be younger, less edu-
cated, and more ideologically diverse than others who share 
their acceptance of ACC.
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